Gagauzia. Against the Current
BSSB.BE stratfor.com 01.02.2016
A key referendum held in an autonomous region of Moldova serves as a reminder that the ongoing EU-Russian competition extends beyond Ukraine and into the broader European borderlands — and that Moscow retains a strong position in many of these countries.
In the referendum, which was held Feb. 2 in the autonomous republic of Gagauzia to decide whether to integrate further with the European Union or with Russia, 98.4 percent of voters chose closer ties with Russia’s Customs Union, while 97.2 percent voted against closer EU integration. It is unlikely that Gagauzia will actually follow through on accession to the Customs Union or split off from Moldova completely, but such discussions will undermine Moldova’s integration plans, as well as those of other countries in the EU-Russian periphery.
Gagauzia is a largely agriculture-based region in Moldova named for the Gagauz people who inhabit the territory. The Gagauz are ethnically Turkic and speak a dialect of the Turkish language, in contrast with the Romanian and Russian-speaking Moldovan majority. The Gagauz make up just fewer than 150,000 of Moldova’s population of 3.4 million and are concentrated mainly in the Comrat municipality and a few nearby communes in southern parts of the country. This territory is significant in the context of Moldova’s broader strategic location between Russia, Turkey and the European Union.
Since Moldova’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Gagauzia has had strong separatist tendencies. The region declared independence from Moldova in August 1991, but after negotiations Chisinau agreed to grant the region the legal status of “special autonomous zone” in 1994.
This diplomatic approach was in stark contrast with another breakaway region, Transdniestria, which fought a brief war with Moldova and achieved de facto independence with Russian military and economic support. Since then, Chisinau has struggled constantly to reintegrate Transdniestria while facing a broadly manageable political situation with Gagauzia.
However, the emergence of a Europe-oriented government in Moldova and the country’s subsequent attempts to achieve closer integration with the European Union have upset the balance between Chisinau and Comrat. Following Moldova’s initialing of key integration agreements with the European Union in November, authorities in Gagauzia announced plans to hold a referendum on the issue.
- While Moldova deemed the poll unconstitutional and tried to block it, the vote was held anyway. In addition to rejecting stronger EU ties in favor of integration with Russia, the vote (which had a reported participation of 70 percent) also showed overwhelming support for Gagauzia’s right to declare independence from Moldova in the event the country cedes its own independence.
- Gagauzia’s option to become independent was stipulated in the region’s 1994 agreement with Chisinau over the special autonomous zone, so while the issue is redundant from a legal standpoint, it is nonetheless symbolic. The question also can be seen in the context of recent statements from Romanian officials on the possibility of Moldova’s reunification with the country, either bilaterally or through the European Union.
There are several reasons for Gagauzia’s referendum.
- One was to send a clear message to Chisinau that the region is firmly against EU integration and that any movement on that front could come with significant consequences.
- Another was to show Gagauzia’s solidarity with Turkey, which has substantial influence in the region through financial assistance and various cultural initiatives. Perhaps most important, the referendum shows in a broader sense that Russia maintains a significant degree of influence and leverage in the country and that any decisions by the Moldovan government must take Russian interests into account.
Moldova is an inherently split country, both in the domestic political landscape and between rival external powers. This creates a potential for instability in the event of a major foreign policy move toward Russia or the West. The reminder to keep Russia’s interests in mind is particularly important as parliamentary elections will be held in November, and the government could undergo a major restructuring, as previous elections have shown.
Beyond Moldova, the referendum demonstrates that the European Union’s attempts to strengthen ties with the European periphery face significant obstacles, even if popular support for EU integration is substantial. As the situation in Ukraine shows, efforts at further integration with the EU — though supported by many — generate significant opposition from domestic elements and from Russia, with potentially volatile consequences. This is also the case in other borderland states such as Georgia, which also has support from the government on EU integration but faces significant obstacles from its own breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Therefore, as integration efforts between these countries and the European Union intensify, opposition to these efforts will likely grow as well. In the case of Ukraine, and possibly in Moldova and Georgia, geopolitical constraints make it extremely difficult for either the West or Russia to convincingly sway the country into its camp. This not only impedes prospects for further integration but also can destabilize each country as competition for influence intensifies.
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Despite the complicated relations between Chisinau and Gagauzia, it seems that there is little danger that the region may become dangerously unstable and force Moldova to change its current geopolitical course.
The region is too small, sparsely populated, and too weak economically to muster enough leverage to put sufficient pressure on the central government. The most prominent political leaders in the region have been using separatist and pro-Russian slogans, both to mobilise their electorate and as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Chisinau.
Importantly, the results of the February referendum (in combination also with other measures) are likely to be used by Russia and by the Moldovan Communists in an attempt to undermine the country’s pro-European foreign policy.
Although the results of the February referendum have not been recognised by Chisinau, they will undoubtedly be turned into a propaganda tool by the opponents of Moldova’s EU integration, both at home and abroad.
- There is no doubt that the issue will be used by the Moldovan Communists and by Russia to destabilise the situation in Moldova, especially ahead of the signing of an association agreement between Chisinau and the EU, scheduled for September.
- It is also possible that Moscow still hopes that the Chisinau government will lose power, triggering a snap election. Consequently, the coming months might see attempts to hold similar “referenda” or opinion polls in other traditionally pro-Russian parts of the country, especially in Moldova’s second largest city (excluding Transnistria) – Bălţi.
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